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The purpose of this paper is to consider the influence that organizational
structure has upon planning. In particular, it is intended to examine the
type of structure most conducive to successful planning—given variation
in the size of organization, the speed of change, and the uncertainty re-
garding means and ends. Stress will be placed on structures and plan-
ning in large organizations with the underlying premise that problems in
this context differ in important respects from those applying in small
organizations. Large organizations suffer from a geometric increase in
the difficulty of (a) successfully communicating intentions and proced-
ures (b) establishing a harmonious system of incentives, and (c) achiev-
ing adequate cohesion among numerous individuals and subunits with
sharply conflicting wills. Herein lies a partial explanation of why large
organizations are given to control by doctrines, which impress the out-
sider as rigid and arbitrary and which inevitably grow stale before
being abandoned. In large organizations it is hard to preserve channels
for and open-mindedness toward dissent, for organizational distance per-
mits keeping dissenters sufficiently far away that only a garbled version
of their message is heard. Yet, large organizations may be forced to co-
exist with dissent in its most crippling form, for their size permits the
preservation of pockets of bureaucratic resistance, which may frustrate
organizational purposes through overt or tacit noncooperation. This
risk of organizational stalemate is especially relevant in relation to those
NOTE: The author is indebted to B. H. Klein and R. N. McKean for their
contributions to a number of the major themes in the paper. In addition, helpful
criticisms of an earliçr draft were supplied by G. R. Hall, V. Taylor, and
C. Wolf, Jr.
Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not
be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official
opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.186 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
large governmental organizations with massive requirements for trained
personnel 1andlegal restrictions on expediting desired personnel turn-
over.
Discussion of improving large organizations is frequently marred by
the concealed assumption that aside from scale their differences from
small organizations are trivial. In planning, the procedures and attitudes
that an individual or a small, closely-knit group might establish are un-
consciously accepted as the appropriate standard. This instinctively
anthropomorphic treatment—in which the large organization appears
as simply the (presumably) rational individual or small group writ
large—is perhaps the most eminent of the intellectualist fallacies that
appear in the debates on organizational structure. It leads almost auto-
matically to advocacy of flexibility and open-mindedness and to extolling
the virtues of sequential decision-making with its attributes of avoiding
commitments to specific goals, willingness to abandon obsolete plans,
and preservation of multiple options—without due appreciation of the
constraints that organizational life per se places on the use of such
maneuvers. Nonetheless, the constraints are impressive and the room for
maneuver may be relatively small. The problem is really one of dis-
cerning and achieving optimal organizational adaptability by weighing
the costs against the gains in flexibility. This would never be easy, but
the problem is made even more intractable because of the variation
over time of optimal adaptability in response to internal dissensions and
external pressures.
Though the issues of organizational structure and planning represented
the focus of the older-style political economy, modern economists, in
deference to the prevailing penchant for precision, have tended to shy
away from the problem. It is too complex—and consequently isill-
adapted to treatment by model-building. But there are other reasons why
talking about planning and structure is hard, and ironically one of them
is that it is so easy. A good many of us carry over the emotional
sets from the more or less ideological disputes of the 30's and 40's.
The attitudes are only partially buried, and the instinct to return to the
old simplicities is strong. Consequently, words like "centralization" and
"decentralization," can elicit a strong reaction—and a vigorous discus-
1Whileit is conceivable that a staff adequate to perform postal services could
be gathered in months or even weeks, itis staggering to think of the problem
that would be posed in replacing all the personnel of the Air Force or Navy.Organizational Structures and Planning 187
sionof first principles. I would not deny that such discussion can pro-
vide guidelines with respect to long-run objectives, but it cannot shed
much light on short-term organizational structure. Attacking current or-
ganizational decisions by reference to slogans regarding long-term ob-
jectives may provide the basis for a rousing argument. It will hardly
be analytically profitable.
In assessing modifications of organizational structures, the issues are
to a large extent ad hoc. It is natural to view organizational change in
terms of the small-end-of-the-wedge-establishing trends, but in organiza-
tional life, more than in politics, the appropriate image is that of a
pendulum swinging to correct existing ills. No organization isquite
right,and, without prodding, organizations will grow typically less
sound over time. To avoid growing stale, any organizational structure
needs an occasional shaking-up or breath of fresh air. Organizational
structures are the right ones only for a specific set of problems and for
a specific distribution of talent. Under different circumstances a variety
of organizational forms will be most suitable. As problems and personnel
change, organizational forms should be altered—and such alterations
ought not be blocked by neuroses concerning the establishing of long-
term trends. It is true, for example, that qualitatively the costs and the
benefits of tightly controlled, centralized organizations do not change
much. Nonetheless, the weights assigned to these costs and benefits
undergo constant alteration, so that on occasion movement toward
tighter control will become appropriate. More generally, changing con-
ditions will make major alterations desirable—even aside from the
stimulative effect of a shake-up.
This paper examines some implications for the planning and organiza-
tional structure of the experience in the Department of Defense since
1961. This is not intended primarily as a detailed analysis of the
problems of defense organization, but rather it is intended to provide
some generalizations and to raise some questions for a broader audience
of professionally-trained people. The broad objectives of defense re-
organization, which prominently featured increased control by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, are widely understood. One objective was
to achieve better coordination of interrelated decisions than that which
"bargaining" among the Services could provide. The other main objec-
tive was to improve choices in general: (a) by looking at full costs rather
than down-payment implications of alternative policies, (b) by costing188 InstitutionalStructures and Defense Spending
in terms of programs or "outputs" rather than inputs, and (c) by
systematically considering alternatives and tradeoffs in terms of cost-
effectiveness. For these objectives there has understandably been wide-
spread sympathy and support. However, there have also been certain
side effects, which have not been given the same attention, and these
have major importance for those interested in the efficient and successful
employment of resources within organizations. My purpose is to point up
some of these neglected considerations and to see what lessons can be
gleaned from this experience.
Since my purpose is, in part, to raise questions, and since some of
my comments will be in a critical vein, it is proper to make my position
clear, by underscoring my wholehearted, if not unique endorsement
of the view that Robert McNamara has been one of the nation's great
public servants. Any proper criticisms must start from this basis. The
reason that we are in a good position to analyze and to criticize is that
McNamara has provided new substance. His aspirations have been high.
Much has been achieved, even more has been attempted. In handling
defense issues, the United States has broken out of the prior mold in
which rigid preplanning oscillated with impulsive ad hoc changes in
programs.2 This is an impressive accomplishment. Nonetheless, complete
success always remains elusive, so it should not be surprising that there
are loose ends and bits of debris that remain tobe straightened out.
2Thisisnot intended asa denigration of McNamara's predecessors. The
Eisenhower administration, I would argue, has been given scant justice in its treat-
ment by the intellectual community—especially in questions of defense. The
Eisenhower administration was alert to the major issues in defense management.
It was concerned with overlapping efforts and duplication, and grappled with
the problems of improving control (McNamara's powers, after all, were instituted
under the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958). Eisenhower himself had ex-
perienced and was scornful of the demands generated through military planning
procedures (see his acid reference to "the so-called military requirements" and
the need for procedures to bring them into bounds, Emmet Hughes, The Ordeal
of Power, New York, 1963, P. 75).
Nonetheless, defense programming continued to be handled in the traditional
way with its rigid and unsatisfiable "requirements" based on simplistic quantita-
tive impulses. Though deeply concerned, the administration was never able to
exploit analytical toolsindealing with the problem. This was Eisenhower's
failure in defense, rather than theissuesthat bothered the public and the
intelligentsia. On those questions Eisenhower has turned out to be right more
frequently than his critics—even on the limited set of issues that were real
problems rather than caricatures. It remains an historical irony that an adminis-
tration, which had presided over the buildup of America's decisivemilitary
edge, should stand condemned at its close for "neglecting the national defenses."Organizational Structures and Planning 189
I. Some Perspectives on Planning
Basically planning implies the programmed commitment of inputs over
time to provide instrumentalities (in a sense, higher-level inputs) which
can handle anticipable future demands. Planning procedures and struc-
tures, however, should be adapted to the degree of confidence that can
be attached to one's forecast of the future. The higher the degree of
confidence, the more explicit advanced planning can be, and the less
need be the concern in committing large organizations to specific types
of activities. Uncertainties always exist with respect to the investment of
inputs and the creation of instrumentalities. These uncertainties are es-
pecially important in R and D, where not only costs but the ultimate
achievements are in question. Additional uncertainties exist regarding
whether the planned-on instrumentalities can adequately handle the San-
ticipated demands and, indeed, whether one can accurately forecast what
such demands will be. In defense, the latter problem is especially
trating, for national objectives are continually changing, partially in re-
flection of internal alterations of preferences and partially of the behavior
of rivals on the international scene. Here, the "uncertainty" is misleading,
for it is not so much uncertainty, as the certainty that objectives will
change over time, and that some years hence they will look considerably
different from those perceived at the start of the planning period. As we
shall see, such considerations should have a major bearing on the plan-
ning process.
Very roughly, one can distinguish between two general approaches to
planning. Cook's-tour planning rests, implicitly or explicitly, on the
supposition that the future is sufficiently certain that we can chart a
straight course years in advance. With this approach, direction, speed,
size of commitment, and achievement milestones (not decision points)
are indicated with, at least, rough precision. By contrast what may
be termed Lewis-and-Clark planning acknowledges that many alterna-
tive courses of action and forks in the road will appear, but their precise
character and timing cannot be anticipated. Neither the size of commit-
ment nor even the direction of movement should be stipulated too far
in advance. At the end of a period one can retrospectively examine the
paths pursued, which include many abandoned initiatives or experiments
and many hard (and possibly erroneous) choices. Only limited con-190 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
fidence could have been placed in advanced predictions regarding which
options would be chosen, when the choices would be made, or how long
alternative courses of action would be pursued before abandonment.
Retrospectively one may map (as in the diagram) what has taken place;
Cook's-tourplanning Lewis-and-Clark planning
butthe planning function is not to chart a precise course of action.
Rather it is to prepare to cope with the uncertain terrain of the future,
to note the signs in the environment showing that a decision point has
been reached, and to respond in a timely fashion.
Wherever uncertainties are substantial the balance should shift in the
direction of Lewis-and-Clark planning. Despite its messiness, its relative
advantage then increases. The appropriate planning concept is one that is
conducive to (1) facing uncertainties (not pushing them aside) and (2)
hedging against uncertainties (i.e., not biased against hedging). Never-
theless, in all bureaucracies there are strong pressures to go too far in
the quest for Cook's-tour planning. In part, this is inevitable in large
organizations as a concomitant to the need for cohesion and the cost
of communications. In part, the pressure is understandable since it may
permit us to commit others to our view of the world, our objectives, and
our strategies.3 In part, it is a form of laziness. Characteristically the
tendency towards precise planning goes much too far, and appropriately
these pressures will be resisted by insightful decision-makers. The cost
of acquiescence is neglect of uncertainties, lost flexibility, neglected and
suppressed options, and less-than-optimal adjustment to changing op-
SAtthe highest level, leaders have a natural inclination to limit the ability
of their successors to alter radically the policies they will inherit. However, at a
point in time the strongest pressures for commitment normally come from
below, particularly from just below the top, where officials are close enough to
have a keen interest in high policy and a keen sense of their own limited
ability to control decisions. The decision-makers may be even less sympathetic
in the future, so why help provide the hedges, options, and elbow room, which
make it easier for them to change their minds. At the highest level there may be
little, sympathy with this motivation, but itis impossible to eradicate it.Organizational Structures and Planning 191
portunitiesand threats existing in the external environment. In evaluat-
ing planning procedures, one must guard against exaggerating the extent
to which the future can be foretold and planning for it precisely charted.
Modifications, which permit greater adaptability in the face of change,
should be introduced. Planning should be based on an accurate view
of the future. Where an accurate projection implies recognition of the
unpredictable and the unknowable, this should be taken into account.
How should organizations decide on a general planning approach?
Aside from the intelligence, reasonableness, and perceptiveness of per-
sonnel,4 three major factors influence an organization's ability success-
fully to plan in a precise and monolithic manner. These are (1) the
size and internal structure of the organization, (2) the dimensions of the
planning problem and the stability of functional relationships, and (3)
the existence and responsiveness of rivals and the organization's ability
to anticipate or to perceive such responses and to make the necessary
adjustments. Examination of these factors will reveal why the realm of
national security is inherently less tractable for planning purposes than
certain other functions like highway planning or the provision of postal
services. Nonetheless, planning for defense is unavoidable, and, despite
the difficulties, greater success has been achieved in defense than in some
other areas which appear to lend themselves better to planning. How-
ever, inherent difficulties are very great. The final measure of success is
to stumble fewer times and in less important ways than one's national
rivals. In evaluating recent defense planning one should keep in mind
therefore that a .400 batting average is a very impressive achievement.
Since all organizations recognize that, in principle, it is better to have more
competent rather than less competent personnel, and since effective organizations
normally do strive to acquire competent people, it would appear that nothing
more need be said on this subject. Unfortunately, what is so readily endorsed
in principle (as indicated by the omnipresent bromides regarding "quality" and
"the best talent" in thriving organizations)isabout the most difficult thing
to achieve in real-world behavior. In all organizations the measure of "com-
petency" tends to become, to a greater or lesserdegree, adherence to the
"party line." In addition, there is the delicate problem of the personality structure
of leading administrators or recruiters, with the selective bias that this introduces
in recruitment and advancement.Reflectingthe psychological tendenciesof
leading figures, organizations will tend to acquire specific personality types with
particular intellectual bents—and will mold other recruitees into the desired
pattern. I will say no more on this subject, despite its importance, other than
to recommend to the reader Harold Lasswell's insightfulstudy, Power and
Personality, New York, 1962.192 institutional Structures and Defense Spending
ORGANIZATIONAL SIZE
The problem of the size and internal structuring of organizations has
already been raised. Achieving cohesive action among large aggregations
of people is itself no mean accomplishment. Communications are very
costly, and are not certain to be successful. Directions must be simple,
and this simplicity, at a higher level, will be reflected in organizational
doctrine that strikes outsiders as appallingly unsophisticated and lacking
in appreciation of the nuances. Change consequently can only be intro-
duced slowly. Without careful preparation, the attempted change will
simply introduce chaos. In light of the problem of successful communica-
tion, even a carefully prepared change must be followed by a shake-
down in which the bugs are eliminated. In operating commands flexi-
bility at any one time can involve only several agreed-on options. Dis-
cipline is at a premium. Individuality must be suppressed. The func-
tionaries are operators not seminar students. The Strategic Air Command,
to take one example, simply cannot tolerate the personal iconoclasm,
frequently irresponsible, which has such a high payoff in a university
or a research organization.
In moving towards smaller, less operations-oriented organizations, the
constraints become less onerous. Partial communication of divergent
ideas becomes increasingly feasible though complete understanding in-
evitably remains illusive. For relatively small groups the sharply reduced
cost of communication permits a relatively full exchange of concepts
without necessarily absorbing all energies in communications and leaving
none for operations. Small groups can adjust quickly (though they need
not necessarily do so). Only within relatively small groups is there much
opportunity for real flexibility. Small groups can change plans, can
avoid advance commitment, can easily maintain options until decision
points are reached. However, once again there is no assurance that they
will do so, especially when defending bureaucratic interests. Whatever
the internal flexibility, a subordinate smaller organization can find good
reasons for attempting to get the parent organization to commit itself
to the options it favors. The impulse to tie down outsiders, while re-
taming internal freedom, is understandable. Nevertheless, it is crucial to
recognize that only in small groups can there be free internal communi-
cations while preserving most energies for work on substantive problems.
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accomplished only in small groups.5 Use of small working groups is,
of course, no guarantee of productive work. Yet for the set of produc-
tion groups, the yield of substantive new work will decline as the group
grows significantly beyond some critical mass.
Herein lies the case for major devolution of responsibility whenever
the promise of change and the existence of uncertainties makes it in-
appropriate to indulge in precise planning, Cook's-tour manner. Major
devolution of responsibility to small or lower-level groups should be
utilized for that work which, especially in the long run but even in the
short, does not involve significant spilovers for other components of the
organization. In defense this includes the bulk of operational assign-
thents, most analytical and developmental efforts, and even some specffic
decisions on weapon systems. Delegation of responsibility is not easy to
practice at the apex of an organization. The natural inclination is to
want to keep control of everything. Nevertheless, one indicator of suc-
cess in large organizations is the willingness to delegate authority rela-
tively far down the pyramid where compact work groups can be found.
U.S. experience suggests that this is most crucial in the development area.
Massive organizations with extensive communications at high, medium,
and low levels will run up costs staggeringly. With given budgets, high
costs mean less output. Reduced cost through devolution of responsibility
could improve the payoff from R and D manyfold. Within the Depart-
ment of Defense, such a structure has not had enormous appeal. Yet,
to achieve high efficiency, very large organizations must exploit the
special advantages that small groups can provide. In the DOD one route
to further improvement would be a willingness to abandon detailed
control in the cases in which it is costly and sift out its problems, dele-
gating responsibility more freely in the many cases where it is feasible.
DIMENSIONS AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS
The less well known the future terrain, the greater the losses in
planning by simple Cook's-tour methods. In order to deal with a not
wholly ascertainable future, one wishes to introduce planning options
and hedges. Under some circumstances, simple hedging is possible with-
out doing much violence to the spirit of Cook's-tour planning. The
A classic statement of the prosposition, not generally known to economists,
may be found in R. B. Kershner's, "The Size of Research and Engineering
Teams," IRE Transactions on Engineering Management, June 1958, pp. 35—38.194 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
critical factor is the number of dimensions to the problem. When one
has high confidence that the important variable is one-dimensional and
quantitative, relatively simple hedging becomes feasible. Consider high-
way construction as an example. Though we are not certain, we have
high confidence that transportation in the future will make considerable
use of some kind of grpund-based, automotive vehicle requiring roads.
We are uncertain regarding the numbers of vehicles and relative usage.
We do know that a major cost in expanding existing highways is the
tearing down and rebuilding of overpasses that restrict the flow of traffic.
A simple, if underutilized, hedge against expanded traffic flow is to make
the original underpass sufficiently wide that additional lanes of traffic
can be provided without demolition. Such a hedge adds measurably to
initial construction costs, but provides insurance against the much higher
cost of rebuilding the overpass much sooner than contemplated in the
original plans. An option is introduced, which may or may not be taken
up. There is an implicit decision point, though it is not precisely timed.
Such one-dimensional hedging against quantitative change is nor-
mally available only for low-order problems, which are mere subelements
in the comprehensive plan of a large organization. Whenever sharp
qualitative changes, which destroy the problems' unidimensional quanti-
tative nature, may be in the offing, hedging becomes far harder. And,
as one adds to the dimensions of the plan by increasing the number of
issues covered, planning ceases to bear any relation to a prescription
o. activities that will be undertaken in the future. Instead planning ap-
propriately becomes a vast hedge, indicating the character, the means of
acquisition, and the use of certain instrumentalities—if certain sets of
circumstances should materialize. Rather than providing an exact pre-
scription of activities, a good plan will admittedly provide no more than
the roughest guidelines.
In order to provide a prescription of activities when there are numer-
ous dimensions, one would have to know how an ever-changing environ-
ment will influence the relative values of the several activities. What
weights will be assigned to different activities, and how will they in-
fluence the distribution of effort? What are the trade-offs, as they will
be seen in the future, among these various categories of activities? (The
trade-off functions undergo continual change in response to the changing
valuation of activities.) Thus, if plans for future activities are adheredOrganizational Structures and Planning 195
to, the results inevitably will be less than optimal. We are not clair-
voyant. Prescription of future activities requires us to have more knowl-
edge of the future than we possibly can. In multidimensional planning,
where future weights and even some future dimensions remain unknown,
planning of future activities can, at best, be only roughly indicative. A
detailed program can be provided only in connection with strategies for
developing new instrumentalities, for providing options. A good plan
can highlight those variables which will importantly influence the ul-
timate decision and can anticipate decision points. But a good plan
should be viewed as a complicated structure to foster intelligent hedging.
It ought not be viewed as a prescription of future activities.
Defense is the most dramatic example of multidimensional planning.
Important qualitative changes are relatively frequent and potentially
devastating. Consequently simple quantitative hedges of the overpass
type are only a small part of a solution to the hedging problem. In
dealing with an unknowable future, much of the burden of hedging falls
on the R-and-D program, preferably one of wide-ranging character.
The purpose of R-and-D is not to provide for the future force structure
per se, but rather to develop and to preserve options, which may or may
not be taken up. Viewed as a system of hedging, R-and-D activities can-
not be made fully compatible with the definition of a program of future
activities. Correctly viewed, a phenomenal R-and-D success does not
necessarily imply acquisition and deployment, whereas, depending on
the strategic situation, a partial R-and-D failure may be followed by
acquisition and deployment. The purpose of R and D is to buy options.
It should be recognized as the first phase of a sequential decision-
making process. Its precise purpose is to reduce the time that would
be required before the achievement of an operational capability. The
low costs of preproduction R and D are accepted as insurance against a
future military demand—without any commitment to the force and
structure. Through an austerely conducted program, an impressive array
of options can be provided. At least in principle, planning in this form—
as a system of acquiring hedges—is relatively simple.6
6Unfortunately,existing organizational arrangements raise imposing barriers
to accomplishment of what seems desirable in principle. These arrangements
create strong pressures—once again from below—making itdifficult to stop a
successful or even semisuccessful program. One large and long-lived office—
the System Program Office (SPO)—is established to handle the individual weapon
system on an integrated basis. R and D, source selection, acquisition, introduc-196 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
Within the force structure, there is less opportunity for hedging. The
importance of this point is hard to overstate. Numerous errors and
incalculable waste can come from premature commitment to a system
that turns out to be unnecessary. The moral is to delay such decisions
until long lead-time items force the decision. The adaptation of the force
structure to deal with as yet undetermined future contingencies is the
most costly, and, therefore, the trickiest part of the planning process.
Since postdecision hedging is so cumbersome, it is important to avoid
forfeiting flexibility by being too quick to anticipate a decision point.
THE RESPONSE OF RIVALS: PERCEPTION AND COUNTERRESPONSE
The existence of major rivals increases planning difficulties—par-
ticularly on the international scene. An organization's perception of the
nature of its rival is based on an oversimplified and partially distorted
interpretation of the rival's earlier behavior. Organizational momentum
and insensitivity make difficult the recognition of gradual alteration in
the rival's conduct which makes the predominant perception increasingly
obsolescent. Only shocks bring major changes in the prevailing per-
ception, which therefore is adjusted only erratically and with lags. Fur-
thermore, the conduct of the rival is influenced by a utility function
hard for outsiders to comprehend, and this conduct is determined by
a bureaucracy, no less cumbersome than our own, which persistently
twists behavior in directions that we—as "objective" outsiders—regard
as irrational. Since we have little appreciation of the crosscurrents and
pressures within the extensive bureaucracy of the opponent, we are
periodically subjected to surprises. Nonetheless, when itis ultimately
perceived that the previously prevailing image of the rival's behavior has
been embarrassingly inaccurate, this image can be drastically revised in
official circles with astonishingly little questioning. A specialist's services
facilitate the process. There are tribal soothsayers who concoct a new
rationalization of the rival's behavior which explains (away) all of his
tion into the force structure, and early operations are therefore treated as parts
of an integrated program. The resultis strong pressure to avoid shelving any
program. Moreover, OSD pressure toward a broader framework for costs—so-
called life-cycle costs—adds to the problem. If analysis and decisions are based
on presumption of a full life cycle, this further militates against recognizing the
legitimacy of termination or shelving of systems. Given its objectives regarding
expanding options, OSD would be well advised to accept some supplementary
costs in order to more firmly establish decision milestones.Organizational Structures and Planning 197
unanticipated actions.7 Off with the old, on with the new, and brush
aside any lingering doubts.
The planning function must take into account the unanticipated be-
havior and responses of the rival and our own lagging perception of and
reactions to them. Precise long-range plans of, say, the force structure
are drawn up on the supposition that the rival will take certain actions,
which likely as not fail to materialize. For successful planning, this
further barrier to planning ahead must be taken into account. If we ad-
here rigidly to long-term prescriptions of our own capabilities and ac-
tions, the results are bound to be less than optimal. Not only is a wholly
satisfactory understanding of the character of the rival's behavior unat-
tainable, but this behavior, whatever it is, is subject to periodic adjust-
ment. There are two reasons for this. First, there is what may look like
a game-theory response (though, particularly in international rivalries
it will be marred by bureaucratic sluggishness and by the erratic trial-
and-error surges by which a change in policy is actually achieved). The
rival will divert his energies from those points that one's own actions
have made potentially less lucrative to other, less well-covered points,
which will now appear relatively more lucrative to him. Abstractly speak-
ing, such a response should be anticipated and preparation for adjust-
ments made. In the real world, however, it may be quite difficult to deal
with, because the governing doctrine of large organizations inevitably
will be simplistic and within that doctrine it is difficult to accommodate
any large number of threats. Second, the rival's view of the world and
his strategies will be independently changing—as will our own. To ob-
tain long-range plans, we are inclined to freeze both our rivals' and our
own view of things. The certainty of change is overlooked, or, more
Needless to say, this is not a condemnation of Kremlinology per Se, but a
plea for better Kremlinology and its like. In existing work too much emphasis is
placed on personalities and the policies they are presumed to represent and on
public statements and their exegesis. Too little attention is paid to the broader
picture of the decision-making process, to internal pressures, and to the real
trend in capabilities. Also, too little attention is paid to past interpretative errors
of our own. If the United States continues to obliterate defective images of its
rivals without careful examination of just where we went astray, we shall never
learn from our mistakes.
On the other hand, offsetting our own debacles, in this respect we may draw
some wry amusement from the role assigned by Moscow and Peking to their
own soothsayers, who are obliged to explain American behavior while developing
or exploiting acceptable Marxist terminology. They have, no doubt, been quite
busy since the start of the Johnson administration.198 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
precisely, it is advantageously disguised through mislabeling it as a type
of "uncertainty," which we proceed to discount.
Large organizations find it hard to anticipate, to recognize, or to ad-
just to change. It is hard for them to focus on a large number of threats
simultaneously, or to anticipate the possible penalties and consequences
of their own successes, or to acknowledge the changeableness of their
own and their rivals' behavior. Changes in the environment can only
be appreciated by small groups initially. Influencing a large organization
—to get the prevailing doctrine changed—is a time consuming process,
and by the time it is accomplished the new views will themselves be on
the verge of obsolescence. This may account for the organizational
propensity to zig and zag. Though the prevailing doctrine may collapse
with surprising suddenness, normally it has already lasted too long.
Fashions change, but the new doctrine is unlikely to be substantially
more sophisticated than the old.8 Though it is perhaps unfortunate that
this is the way things are, the realities must be taken into account.
11. Some Implications forDefensePlanning
The changeableness of the world scene and attitudes toward it, and
the multidimensionality of defense problems severely restrict the poten-
tial effectiveness of long-range planning in defense relative to certain
nondefense Yet, concomitantly, there is a pressing need for such
planning, especially in light of the long lead-time items involved in
procurement. Moreover, much of the near- and intermediate-term force
structure is determined by what is already in inventory; for long system
life and the heavy outlays on capital equipment preclude very rapid
turnover. The factors previously enumerated therefore hardly permit us
to discard advance planning. Rather, they provide warning flags which,
by discouraging us from harboring too high expectations, may facilitate
superior planning over the long haul.
8 Seemingly the United States has found it difficult to settle on some reasonable
middleground betweentheatheistic-materialistic-Communist-world-conspiracy
view of the Soviet Union and the I-like-old-Joe-but-he's-a-prisoner-of-the-Politburo
view (a later version being, after-Cuba-we-can-trust-Nikita). During Phase II
we come to expect the Soviet leaders to pull our chestnuts out of the fire.
A similarly oscillating tendency seems to be developing with respect to the
U.S. view of China. From the image of China as a woefully weak, fearful, and
easily deterrable state we appear to be veering to an image of China as the
paramount threat to world peace, heilbent on world conquest in the seventies.Organizational Structures and Planning 199
One major implication is that changeableness in objectives, in strategic
views, and in the utility of instrumentalities, by underscoring Knight's
distinction between risk and uncertainty (the latter dealing with con-
ditions for which probability distributions are unknown), brings us to a
view of planning which is essentially Schumpeterian. Successful plan-
ning in the long run may be set in partial contrast to efficient planning
in the short run. Excessive concern with the latter may involve some
sacrifice of the former. An overweening concern with the microdetail
of efficiency in the small may lead us to overlook what constitutes ef-
ficiency in the large, i.e., success. This appears especially germane for
forces designed for fighting wars as opposed to deterrence. In this con-
nection the general-purpose forces, as the name perhaps suggests, de-
serve special attention.
In force planning the paramount question remains: in what war or
conflict will the forces be engaged? Are the forces to be optimized for
a specific kind of conflict, and, if so, which one? Optimization of forces
for what appears to be the most probable or most threatening conflict
will, no doubt, enhance their capability for that type of engagement, but
may do so at the expense of their general-purpose utility. Despite the
vast improvement of the general-purpose forces in the past five years,
there is some question whether the OSD has been sufficiently alert to this
point. Encouraged by the proved role for systems-analysis techniques, the
OSD has appeared eager to optimize in situations in which the under-
lying realities provide an inadequate foundation. Specifically there has
been a disinclination to recognize the flattening effect that time and
changing contexts have on trade-off curves. It •is hoped that systems anal-
ysis can provide a precise answer to force-structure planning. As be-
tween program elements it is assumed that there is a sharp elbow in the
trade-off curve, which analysis will uncover. Considerable energy has
been devoted to such work. By contrast, insufficient attention has been
given to examining the implications for force composition of the wide
range of conificts in which the United States might become engaged. Im-
plicitly, it is accepted that forces optimized for one kind of war will be
suitable for Other kinds of war;that forces designed for a major struggle
°Ihave couched this discussion in terms of the OSD, which has accepted this
premise in of its analytical work. However, the Services have been even
less inclined to consider wide conflict variability in determining the characteristics
of forces. In certain cases the OSD has urged the Services to take conflict variety
into account in designing equipment and organization. Design of divisions is a200 InstitutionalStructures and Defense Spending
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(forexample, an all-out Soviet assault in Europe) will prove quite
adaptable for lower-order conflicts. As between types of conflict, the
relevance of optimization seems to disappear, because it is assumed that
lower-order capabilities are automatically provided as spillovers from
capabilities for major conflicts. In short, forces are viewed as highly
complementary for certain major conflicts, but the same forces are seen
as highly substitutable in different conflicts. For a specific conflict, op-
tiinization is crucial, but among conflicts it is insignificant.
The point may be indicated briefly. In Figure I, Part A pertains to
force planning for a specific major conflict. Two program elements are
indicated on the axes—say, tactical air and infantry divisions. It is pre-
sumed that there is sharp curvature of the trade-off function providing a
clear-cut point of optimization at small' a. Part B indicates the role
assigned to the same forces in a variety of conflict situations. Different
hypothetical conflicts are places on each axis. In this case it is assumed
that the trade-off function shows little curvature. In other words, forces
optimized for one type of conflict can be substituted in other conflicts
with little penalty in terms of potential payoff. On the face of it, there
would appear to be little reason to presume that optimization is crucial
for one set of circumstances but has little relevance for the other set in
major case in point, and intermittent OSD pressure for a small, inexpensive
counterinsurgency aircraft is another. Part of the problem can be attributed to
the OSD desire to have major initiatives come from the Services. Nevertheless,
the OSD itself apparently has been too ready to accept the proposition that
forces are highly substitutable as between potential wars.
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which conditions are, by definition, more varied. The ultimate effect of
any such line of thought, it should be noted, is that optimization of
forces is achieved by contemplating a single type of conflict—and ig-
noring the rest.
Such a procedure appears dubious in concept. The typical fare of the
present world struggle is not the expected wars, but rather the crises
that erupt at times and in places where they were not anticipated. In
Cuba and in Vietnam, U.S. forces have been deployed to deal with
conflict situations other than those for which they were optimized. U.S.
forces must be developed to deal with the unexpected. A principal objec-
tive is to provide the physical means for crisis management. And crises
almost invariably come as a surprise to one of the participants—and
must be handled by a quick response.
Evidence of our inability to plan the future force structure for con-
tingencies that actually materialized literally abounds. When the Ken-
nedy administration came into office in 1961 there was concern that our
posture did not deter a belligerent Soviet Union from major military ac-
tion—either a bolt-from-the-blue or a major conventional assault in
Western Europe. In retrospect, it seems clear that the buildup of strategic
missile forces was more rapid than necessary. What is perhaps even
more revealing was the focus on developing conventional forces capable
of dealing with an all-out conflict in Western Europe. This goal has more
recently been de-emphasized for a number of reasons, not the least of
which is that we no longer consider the Soviets to be that bold. I would
be the last to suggest that the administration's concern was unwarranted.
Nonetheless, energies devoted to this kind of war did divert attention
from the creation of capabilities for other types of wars.1° (At that time
there existed a dominating reluctance to contemplate American involve-
ment in a major ground war in Asia.) 11Forcesdesigned for the major
European war role might not be readily adaptable to other contingencies.
If divisions are designed to fight a major foe in the North German plain,
they may prove to be an unwieldy instrument for coping with a scattered
and hidden foe in the marshlands or forests of Vietnam.
Turning to tactical air forces, it is notable that major effort was devoted
10 OSDdid push the development of the Special Forces. While good in
itself, this represented, however, a very small proportion of the total effort.
11Thismay illustrate the problems• inherent in accepting concepts or doctrines
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to the TFX fighter, the principal new weapon system authorized during
the early years. This was a costly vehicle, obviously inappropriate for a
lengthy war of attrition against a foe with weak air armament. Its princi-
pal justification lay in its role for major war—possibly nuclear. Though
hardly appropriate for a steady-attrition, conventional war with limited
air opposition, the F-i 11 (TFX) and the F-4 were planned to increas-
ingly dominate our tactical air posture. In Vietnam, however, we have
become engaged in such a steady-attrition, conventional war. We had
programmed neither the appropriate type nor number of tactical aircraft
to carry on that war and fulfill our other commitments.12 The program
adjustments that have become necessary illustrate how actual develop-
ments may come as a surprise to planners. In discussing the 1965—1969
Defense Program in early 1964, Secretary McNamara indicated that
both the B-57's and the F-102's would be quickly phased out.'3 The
plans later were altered dramatically. The B-57's were not phased out,
but were shipped to Vietnam and became for a time our principal tacti-
cal bomber. The F-102's were also retained in service, though "for
planning purposes," it continued to be indicated that they would all be
gone by June 1966.14 Such adjustments merely illustrate the infeasibiity
of precise advance planning. Plans belong in a hypothetical loose-leaf
folder, so that when adjustments are desired, they can readily be made.
The tactical air forces situation, however, reveals a more fundamental
problem in planning. For many years the selection of equipment and the
training of personnel in the Air Force have presupposed the use of
nuclear weapons in major conflict conditions. Nuclear weapons per-
mitted the number of required sorties to be held down. Aircraft were
expensive and designed for nuclear delivery. High investment per air-
craft, as well as the expected fire power per sortie, tended to hold down
the number of aircraft. Attrition—with the low sortie rates expected—
would be bearable in terms of total cost and the drain on aircraft in-
ventory. On the other hand, the DOD has repeatedly signalled its inten-
12 The unveiling of the B-52 bomber in its tactical role may represent the kind
ofserendipity on which policy-makers count.Cost-effectivenesscalculations,
however, raise some question whether this really was an appropriate solution.
Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House
Armed Services Committee of the Fiscal Year 1965—69 Defense Program and
1965 Defense Budget, January 27, 1964.
14 Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House
Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1966—70 Defense Program and
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tion to keep wars conventional, if possible. Nonetheless, the aircraft
inventory permitted was adjusted to a war different from the one being
fought in Vietnam. Expensive and vulnerable aircraft are flying repeated
sorties against heavy ground fire. The cumulative attrition is high. Not
only are costs far higher than they would be with more appropriate air-
craft, but the attrition in this peripheral war is draining the inventory at
an unanticipated rate. More important, the DOD, which had explicit
notions regarding how such a war should be fought, did not see to it that
appropriate equipment was provided to fulfill its strategic intentions.15
The deficiencies of precise advanced planning can also be illustrated
with respect to the strategic forces—though perhaps less dramatically
than in the case of tactical air forces. From 1961 to 1963 bitter con-
troversy was generated in the Pentagon regarding the size of the Minute-
man force five years or more in the future. Figures which had tentatively
been approved by the OSD had subsequently been revised downward.
The point is not only that the plans were changed, but that the energies
expanded in the controversies were used in an unproductive manner.
Not only did the OSD seem to be taking back capabilities on which it
had committed itself, which caused some bitterness, but the issue need
never have been decided in the first place. Given some stability in
strategic objectives,16 U.S. strategic capabilities will be determined by
the forces deployed by potential foes, primarily the Soviet Union. Since
predictions of how rapidly the Soviets would deploy strategic capabilities
have repeatedly turned awry, it would seem the better course of wis-
dom not to precipitate such questions prematurely. Decisions regarding
the size and composition of the strategic forces should not be deter-
mined until the major uncertainties regarding the enemy's posture have
been resolved—or until long lead-time items force the decisions upon
us. Planning too far in advance means the forfeiting of options.
Ultimately we must accept the fact that advance planning necessarily
entails partial failure. The instrumentalities are never quite right for the
circumstances in which they are employed. But a partial failure also
means a partial success. A typical reason that the instrumentalities pro-
15 The bureaucratic aspects of this problem will be discussed in Section III.
16 Differences between the OSD and the Services regarding objectives—what
strategic superiority means and what margin of superiorityis desired—would
inevitably breed some controversy. However, the level of eontroversy can be
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vided prove distinctly suboptimal is that the type of conflict for which
they were originally intended has been successfully deterred. In the con-
temporary power struggle the United States should expect to fight "the
wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time." It may do so re-
luctantly, as did the Truman administration in Korea, or with greater
commitment, as does the Johnson administration in Vietnam. Nonethe-
less, as long as deterrence is largely successful, the wars in which we be-
come involved are likely to occur in places for which we are least well
prepared. Although by its nature this consideration is difficult for plan-
fling to take into account, it is essential that it not be overlooked in
planning. Overoptimization—by designing forces for the most obvious
possible wars—may be the surest way of hampering the use of our po-
tential power.
The gulf between the wars for which we prepare and the wrong wars
that we fight at the wrong times and in the wrong places brings us back to
the organizational image of the outside world and the nature of foes, an
image which, as indicated above, tends to rigidity and to obsolescence.
Sudden changes in this image frequently coincide with changes in ad-
ministration, which in the United States are typically associated with
"new looks in defense" of one sort or another. While on the outside, the
opposition broods on capabilities, possible wars, and the nature and be-
havior of foes, which the incumbents are presumed to be willfully over-
looking. Not uncommonly the opposition is correct, but these views,
nurtured on the outside, become dominant on the arrival in power.
When they become dogma, they may not only be out of date, but be-
come increasingly more so, particularly when adhered to rigidly. This
provides an explanation, not only of why we fail to prepare for the war
that we actually fight, but also why zigs tend to follow zags in military
policy. The more quickly obsolescent views, which gestated on the out-
side, are jettisoned, the better. It is to the credit of the Kennedy adminis-
tration that the bomber gaps, missile gaps, and early rhetoric were so
quickly forgotten. The tendency to provide another zig to follow the
previous zag was certainly there. Much of the credit undoubtedly be-
longs to McNamara's introduction of analytical techniques, which has
transformed the discussion of military problems, and somewhat alleviated
the tendepcy for new military policy to represent simply the replacement
of one set of prejudices by another.Organizational Structures and Planning 205
111. Bureaucratic Problems
The introduction of radically different methods of planning and man-
agement have, on balance, significantly improved the quality of defense
decision-making. Yet, as must be expected, in grappling with the old
problems, certain new problems have been created. Partly this reflects
that certain consequences could not be foreseen when the scheme of re-
form was initially formulated. In addition, it will be recognized that any
major redistribution of power implies "losses" for particular groups and
individuals. Inevitably this leads to resistance, conflict, and misunder-
standing. In this section we shall explore both the unanticipated develop-
ments and the dilemmas that have emerged.
First, let us examine the impact of the introduction of cost-effective-
ness analyses in the determination of force structure decisions. Aside
from the issues of prerogatives and power involved in the question of
who must ultimately decide, it should be understood that an underlying
difference exists between the conceptual approaches of the new breed of
systems analysts and the professional officer corps. Let us consIder this
question without concern for which approach is right or wrong, for we
shall discover that each position has something that could be said for it.
By training and inclination, the military officer is reluctant to drift too
far from the concrete, and in large measure the concrete implies the
fruits of past experience. This helps to account for the stress placed on
campaign histories in military institutions and the "lessons" presumed to
be gleanable from such historical analyses. Experience helps one to dis-
tinguish between superficially plausible hypotheses and the capabilities
that will survive in the heat of battle. Command experience makes one
keenly aware of the miseries of command and control, and the criticality
of the human factor. The weaknesses of men will surface in battle, and
only discipline and organization, not analyses or irrelevant pep talk,
will shore them up. In examining new equipment or concepts, officers
are not disposed to ignore man or man-equipment relations subsumed in
organizations.
By contrast, the method of systems analysis is to look at the hypo-
thetical future rather than at experience, to assess objectives, and to
suggest how best to accomplish these objectives given the available and
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carryover represented by sunken costs. The human factor—how men
are likely to perform—tends to be de-emphasized, since it is difficult to
draw into the analytical structure. Stress, is placed on such elements as
weapon effectiveness, gross fire power, vulnerability, survivability, and
communications equipment—to the exclusion of the more intangible
elements. The greater the rate of technical change, the more appropriate
is such an approach. Yet, the weight is increasingly placed on hypothesis
and Concrete experience, which the military perhaps mis-
takenly regard as providing something less hypothetical, receives little
attention.
Experience provides the basis of military intuition or judgment, which
has not infrequently been treated derisively by civilians. Once again,
however, the military approach contains a kernel of truth. The mili-
tary professionals have recognized, quite correctly in my view, that all
decisions must ultimately be based on intuition.17 This insight did lead,
unfortunately, to a downgrading of analysis and neglect of its role in
"educating" intuition, with the result that analytical efforts were not
pushed as far as possible. By contrast, the defense intellectuals, imbued
with the sense of their own rationality, tended to push analysis further
than it reasonably could be pushed. In the early years of enthusiasm an
image was created that somehow systems analysis led directly to the
appropriate decision. This is not, of course, the case.18 The only result
was the mislabeling by the civilians of their own intuitions and judg-
ments as "analysis." 19
This divergency in view led in the early years to misunderstandings
which happily are now declining in importance. It is now more widely
recognized that analysis cannot lead directly to decisions. Its purpose is
17am here dealing with the most insightful of military observers. That much
commentary has been something less than insightful cannot be denied. Many
officers have employed "intuition" as a kind of incantation without appreciating
its proper role—and have tended to confuse it with rules of thumb and very tired
old formulas.
18 No doubt this was in part the hoopla that surrounds any major reform.
In the heat of controversy it was easy to fall back on the argument that "our"
solutions flow from scientific study, "yours" do not. At RAND and elsewhere,
however, the better practitioners of systems analysis have' long recognized the
dependence of analysis on an irreducible minimum of intuition.
19 There may be a real dilemma at this point. Too early acknowledgment
of the final role that intuition must play may inevitably lead to impairment of
analysis. Yet, postponing recognition of its role may preclude perception of the
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to gather evidence, to improve the quality of discussion, and to sharpen
the intuitions of the decision-maker. By themselves the analyses ignore
complexities and intangibles, which the military rightly stress, and the
decision-maker will appropriately take into account. While every effort
should be made to reduce dependence on sheer intuition, the role of
intuition at the conclusion remains embarrassingly large.2°
There is a second problem, the resolution of which still requires
major action. The alteration in the structure of power within the De-
partment of Defense since 1960 has resulted in a slicing up of authority
and responsibility in ways that do not mesh. The Office of the Secretary
of Defense has acquired the authority to specify major objectives and
policies in planning, but their implementation requires positive motiva-
tion and action on the part of the Services. Proposals normally come up
from the Services. The OSD is reluctant to introduce major new com-
ponents in the force structure solely on its own initiative. But the pro-
posals coming up from the Services may not be appropriate for the
implementation of OSD objectives and policies. And, when such a failure
occurs, controversy ensues regarding just where the responsibility lies.
I have already mentioned that the tactical air forces, both in numbers
and design, were developed with nuclear delivery in mind. On top of the
existing force structure the OSD has superimposed a preferred strategy
of U.S. acceptance of the nuclear firebreak with initial recourse, wher-
ever possible, to conventional weaponry. To achieve major impact with
such a strategy requires greatly increased sortie generation, more numer-
ous, appropriately designed, and presumably cheaper aircraft, and much
greater logistical capabilities. The Air Force has continued to stress
relatively small numbers of high-quality aircraft. But more important
the OSD has been reluctant to face either the bureaucratic or the resource
implications of its strategy. It has not been prepared to insist that the
force posture be changed—nor has it clearly been willing to provide the
20Itcould not be otherwise. Pressures of time preclude the chief decision-
makers from examining and assessing the detail of the many analyses presented
to them. The decision-makers must exercise judgment regarding which analyses
(and whose interpretation) they will accept. They can only dip into the analytical
details in a most cursory manner. It has been observed—in a questioning tone—
"that the higher one goes in the Pentagon the less rigorous is the analysis." This
is true, but, given pressures of time, little can be done about it.Structurally,
nothing can ultimately substitute for the decision-maker's intuition, though hope-
fully these intuitions will be consistent with careful analytical work done at
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necessary resources while requiring that the Air Force make the major
investment which will permit an extended campaign of conventional
bombing. It has been a steady complaint within the OSD that the
Services have been uncooperative. Five years after the new accretion of
authority in OSD this refrain provides, at least in my view, an in-
creasingly flimsy excuse for inaction. If the, authority to determine over-
all strategy falls to the OSD, that implies that it also acquires the re-
sponsibility to see to it that the instruments and financial resources are
provided to implement its preferred strategy. Perhaps the reluctance to
face the bureaucratic or cost implications of strategic choice is under-
standable, but that then raises a question of the appropriateness of treat-
ing the Services as handy scapegoats.
A third element of conflict is introduced, when we consider the issue
of responsibility in its broadest terms. In principle, within the Depart-
ment of Defense a proposal can be initiated by one or more of the
Services, the OSD, and other major DOD subelements, and that pro-
posal will be evaluated on its own merits. In practice, it does not work
out this way. Such a system requires a disinterested judge, but the OSD
fills the roles of both judge and plaintiff, which quite naturally raises
questions about its degree of detachment. On many issues the OSD is
obliged to make the decision. There is no suitable alternative. Nonethe-
less, the facade of objectivity—as a mask for constituted authority—may
reasonably stir resentment. The OSD sets defense objectives, but it seems
inappropriate then to dismiss Service proposals scornfully on grounds
that the proposal is more in accord with the Service's notion of strategy
than its own. The OSD establishes the ground rules for debate. But if it
interprets or restricts the application of those ground rules so as to fur-
ther strategic 'notions of its own, it should not be surprised when such
actions are regarded as an unfair exercise of authority.
Let me give a specific illustration. Since 1961 much stress has been
laid on creating multiple options. All informed persons will agree that
such an approach is desirable in principle, not only for the DOD but
for other organizations as well. Unfortunately options have a habit of
running up against constraints, and the decision must be made whether
the option will be forfeited or the constraint relaxed. In organizational
life, despite the lip-service to multiple options, the observed tendency is
to be deeply concerned regarding the options the dominant group
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groups. This is the way the world is, but we should recognize that op-
tions conifict and that leaders are normally more concerned about their
options than about options generally.
A clear example is the present endorsement in national policy of a
nuclear firebreak. My personal view is that the government has been
more concerned with establishing the firebreak than it should have been.
That, however, is not my point, which is that the firebreak represents a
constraint cutting across the multiple-option approach. The government
has refrained from making certain investments in the capabilities for
low-level nuclear warfare, not only because of the expense but because
the creation of the options might tempt us to go through the firebreak,
and would certainly give others the impression that we were willing to do
so. This is national policy. It may be sound national policy. Nonetheless,
it represents the deliberate exclusion through a self-denying ordinance of
a whole range of options. Policy discussion should acknowledge that we
are frequently as interested in creating constraints as in creating options.
Just as we may avoid the costs of creating some options, so we may
readily incur the costs of creating constraints, i.e., option denials. From
public discussion it has not been at all obvious that we are willing to in-
vest major resources in establishing constraints. If greater clarity were
attained, controversies could focus on the real issues. In the case of
nuclear weaponry, the real issue is: Do we wish to deny ourselves cer-
tain options? It is certainly legitimate for leaders to be interested in
their options, and to wish to avoid other options. If that is the goal, dis-
cussion should focus on its validity, and it should not be obscured by
inspirational talk on generalized option creating.
Such considerations have broad applicability to long-range planning
under conditions of Unless a plan consists primarily of the
indication of numerous options by which one may respond to the un-
known, it must represent something of a corset. Time forces certain
decisions, but wherever a plan represents premature commitment to
arrangements that may be far from optimal, it becomes an instrument
for option-denial. At best, the plan will be readapted—at the cost of
energies which might more profitably have been invested elsewhere. At
worst, the commitment to less-than-optimal arrangements will be hon-
ored. Normally the results will fall between the two poles, but bureau-
cratic pressures push in the direction of the latter pole. It has already
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of 1967—1968 had to be adjusted downward in 1963—1964 with a con-
siderable investment of energy in bureaucratic fighting. The decision
reflected changes in intelligence estimates and in strategic concept. The
point is that it required strength to change programs that need not have
been formalized. A Defense Secretary with less courage and strength
than Robert McNamara possesses might well have hesitated to alter
plans which he had previously accepted. In that case defense allocations
would admittedly have diverged from the optimum. This is, of course,
only one illustration. More generally, the Five-Year Force Structure and
Financial Program developed in DOD since 1961, may readily lead to
premature commitments, tending to reduce the number of options. There
is a bias against readjustment, which only strong personalities can over-
ride. In some cases, as with the nuclear firebreak, option-denial can be
understood as a reflection of national policies which seek constraints on
particular types of violence. In other cases, option-denial may flow from
the inflexibility of bureaucratic processes. In the latter case, it is unin-
tended, and therefore much less justifiable. To the extent that the Five-
Year Force Structure and Financial Program leads in this direction, it
cuts against optimal long-range planning.
The fourth bureaucratic issue to be examined is the inteffigent han-
dling of dissent. In the nature of organizational life, this is perhaps the
hardest of all. Since much resistance is blind, it is all too easy
for leadership to treat all opposition as if it were blind. How can one
provide an effective channel for dissent without providing a forum for
obscurantism? The ultimate difficulty arises, quite unavoidably, from the
stringent limits on the individual's capacity to communicate with others
—but is intensified by problems of access. One learns normally only
from the people with whom one talks, about policy issues, if not theory.
Beyond the umbra of organizational intimates, there is a penumbra of
others whose ideas become distorted and oversimplified as they are
carried over distances. And beyond the penumbra is the contemptuously-
treated darkness represented by the reprobates and the unknowns. Un-
der the best of circumstances a really creative idea, because it is new, is
hard to sell. It is likely to bear some semblance to some older heresy,
and may casually be dismissed on those grounds. However, if one wor-
ries continually about dissent, all his energies will be dissipated. Effective
organizations are not debating societies given over to dispute regarding
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sufficientchannel for dissent must be maintained, so that the views of
the dissenters are not irretrievably lost.21
The normal difficulty is intensified by the tendency for organizations
to become obsessed wi.th their current problems and activities. Once
again, this is natural, if counterproductive. At present there are indica-
tions that the Vietnamese war has led to a degree of brooding over
China that is distorting not only our perceptions regarding China, but
the rest of the world as well. When existing problems are frustrating
and exhausting, little energy is left for detached appraisal. I suspect
there is no wholly satisfactory solution, but it is important not to lose
sight of the problem.
Perhaps some alleviation can be attained by the freeing of a number
of high officials from day-to-day functional tasks. Walter Bagehot's con-
cept of the cabinet minister as an outsider, detached from the routine
processes of administration and free to ask probing questions, is prob-
ably inapplicable in the American context. The American system requires
that secretaries both manage and represent their departments. Yet, there
may be room for something like a Special Assistant for Devil's Ad-
vocacy charged with the responsibility to raise challenges to the pre-
vailing concepts. Through a structurally supported position of partial
independence, he may be able to save his leaders from longer-run slips
arising from their preoccupation with current problems. The danger that
doctrinaire or organizational blindness will be accepted as deep sophis-
tication will be reduced. Useful dissent, which might otherwise be
drowned in natural bureaucratic conflicts, would have greater chance to
emerge.
The institutional problems which have been discussed—experience
versus a hypothetical future as a guideline to conduct, authority har-
nessed to responsibilities, the wise creation and preservation of options,
and the appreciation of intelligent dissent—have been couched in terms
of defense management problems of the last five years. Though others
may disagree, I would submit that these are the issues that have de-
manded attention. It should be apparent, however, that their applicability
21Preservinga channel for intelligentdissentisan even greater problem
within the military establishment. What I have said earlier regarding the necessary
paramountcy of doctrine in operating commands bespeaks a certain sympathy
for the military in coping with their problems. Nonetheless, it is plain that customs
and habits of mind developed in operational contexts have spilled over into the
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is not restricted to the Department of Defense. More generally, they
would seem relevant to all large organizations, when the attempt is made
to bring them under unified management.
JV. Final Remarks
Centrally controlled planning in the Department of Defense since 1961
must be regarded as one of the major planning experiments of all time.
it is a commonplace that expenditures by the DOD each year exceed
the gross national products of all but six or seven nations. Of course,
the range of activities is circumscribed, so that planning DOD's activities
is far simpler than planning economic activities in a modern indus-
trialized state like France or Japan. On the other hand, the complexity of
its activities may be roughly on a par with total activities in, say, India.
(Complexity here refers solely to activity range rather than to the avail-
ability of specialized managerial personnel and technology or to the
responsiveness of the total system to control from the top, both of which
are markedly lower in India.) The DOD operates with limited market
information, and must therefore rely on other techniques to provide the
information for its basic allocatIon decisions. When the size and com-
plexity of the effort is taken into account, the DOD does remarkably
well. Given an equivalent degree of talent and sensitivity to central
control, one could run an economy with the same management pro-
cedures.22 There is no reason why one should want to do so: the economy
would function clumsily and relatively unprogressively. But it can be
done. For this reason DOD experience does provide some insight into
the problems of nations attempting major economic planning. In particu-
lar, national economic planning involves a multidimensional set of prob-
lems, which makes it unwise to attempt precise advance planning.
With changing technology, sources of supply, tastes, and objectives, the
proper inference would be to stress rough, indicative planning of the
Lewis-and-Clark type. Attention should be given to the flagging of
22 "Running an economy" here refers to the technical instruments of control.
The analogy to a planned economy is not intended to be a complete one—for
in a planned economy the problem of choice isfar more intractable than in
the DOD. The DOD operates within a larger organizational framework; it re-
ceives guidelines from above; and it can accept the primacy of organizational
goals. DOD therefore provides relatively little guidance regarding how a planned
economy should choose, but, assuming that the choices have been made, it
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decision points and the building in of options. If planning is in the
nature of prescription, it is bound to be costly—and will probably be
inaccurate as well. For planning variegated activities under conditions of
uncertainty, indicative planning—because it lacks precision and rigidity
—is the appropriate means for attaining the best result possible, though
not the best possible result. In this case, as in others, the hypothetical
best can be an enemy of the attainable good.
In a sense what the DOD has been attempting is to develop a very
broad quality control system—one that will statistically improve the
quality of decisions in an organization with an enormous range of
activities. Part of the intention is to hold down the goof rate. Far more
important, however, is holding down the aggregate costs of goofs. There
is no doubt that the McNamara regime has made at least as many errors,
particularly errors of commission, as its predecessors, but that is no basis
for criticism. In fact, it may be the reverse, for under conditions of un-
certainty making numerous, small "errors" is the appropriate way that
one gropes toward a set of decisions which most efficiently satisfy one's
aspirations. Even with a standardized product it is recognized that a
quality-control system, which seeks zero defects, is reaching for a costly
objective of questionable meaningfulness. For the DOD, holding down
the average costliness of errors and aggregate error cost is the appropriate
objective. And, it is in this respect that the McNamara regime represents
so great an improvement over itspredecessors, for enormous and
wasteful activities of dubious effectiveness have been ruthlessly pruned.
The number of "errors" may be permitted to rise—as long as stringent
limits are placed on resources devoted to the care and feeding of white
elephants.
The simple cost savings are perhaps the most obvious benefit stem-
ming from the OSD-led managerial, revolution. It reflects the more lucid
articulation of objectives associated with the introduction of cost-effec-
tiveness analysis and program budgeting. (The more lucid articulation
of objectives is a gain in itself, even though the question whether the
objectives ultimately chosen are the right ones must remain a matter of
opinion.) There is no question that most of the programming-budgeting
structure will survive, as it should. It is not only another way of struc-
turing budgets, it is an improved way. I myself doubt whether the same
attention will continue to be paid to the long-range program and the
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less, the output-oriented ordering of expenditures represents an enormous
structural improvement. In addition, the general principles of cost-effec-
tiveness analysis are unlikely to be swept aside. Even if we recognize that
"analysis" as a doctrine or battle cry has been competitively used in the
Pentagon as a weapon in bureaucratic controversies, there is little doubt
that at base it is the most powerful technique yet devised for improving
governmental decision-making. The details of particular analyses will,
of course, continue to be subjected to rigorous examination. Moreover,
because the technique provides a radical means for questioning prevail-
ing ideas and methods of procedure, we must anticipate a continuation of
bureaucratic resistance. When active resistance becomes unpromising,
recourse will be taken to passive resistance. Nevertheless, cost-benefit
analysis is here to stay.
These new management tools may be the primary technical contribu-
tion of the McNamara regime. In defense, what is perhaps even more
important is the psychological contribution. McNamara has succeeded
in stirring up a very stale mill pond dominated by old habits, prej-
udices, intuitions, and good ideas which had not been rigorously formu-
lated. For this the nation will remain forever in his debt. But itis
important to keep in mind that, although the new techniques help, the
stimulating impact of the stirring-up of the stale mill pond would have
come even in the absence of these techniques. The contribution of the
new regime goes well beyond the specific institutional reforms that one
can list.
Despite the improvements, problems remain. The Department of De-
fense is a far-flung organization with a highly variegated structure of
activities. Such organizations have difficulty in preserving flexibility and
creativity and in preventing organizational doctrine and other constrain-
ing influences from snuffing out creativity. No doubt a major part of the
answer is the better exploitation of the unique characteristics of the
small group with its opportunities for low-cost communication and es-
cape from organizational doctrine. In view of the diversity within the
orgaiiization, this may appear as an obvious part of the solution, but
large organizations find it difficult to provide real freedom to small
groups or to give an attentive hearing to new ideas that such groups may
produce. More will have to be done on this problem. And more wifi
have to be done on the closely allied problem of providing a channel
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This issue of correctly handling dissent poses something of a dilemma.
Those who are most tolerant of dissent are frequently those who place
the least value on it and are consequently impervious to its pinpricks.
The Eisenhower administration, for example, had a deep-seated con-
tempt for sensation-mongering critics, and in the nature of things these
critics wound up on the outside, Yet, it allowed external criticism to
flourish without reproof, if without much interest. The administrations
since 1961, more politically aware, perceived quite clearly the penalty
that the Eisenhower administration had paid for its lack of alertness to
criticism. They have no inclination to make the same mistake. Every
effort is made to counteract criticism, and this has overflowed into the
overpowering of dissent. It is a seeming irony that the tolerance for
criticism has diminished. The present regime is more responsive to
criticism, can comprehend its message more precisely, but just because
it takes it so much more seriously, it has tended to be more resentful.
Here is a point of danger. Is it possible to have an alertness and sensi-
tivity to criticism and at the same time not have that sensitivity lead to a
querulous reaction, which results in the attempt to push the criticism
aside?
It is the higher-order objectives which in the long run are likely to
prove most important and the most controversial. But for all the sensi-
tivity on the subject, one has the feeling that talents and expertise are
concentrated elsewhere, and that less attention is paid than is appropriate
to higher-order objectives and the changes they must undergo as the
environment changes. The Department of Defense has done an effective
job in considering appropriate middle-level inputs for middle-level ob-
jectives. These are the issues that lend themselves to relatively precise
answers. Moreover, these are the current issues that absorb so much
energy that comparatively little is left for considering such issues as the
shape of the world and how it is changing and the appropriate higher-
order objectives and how they will be influenced by external change.
Achieving efficient management, while desirable in itself, may not be
the most important thing in the long run. Some relief from the distrac-
tions of current pressures must be given so that energies can be devoted
to study of higher-order objectives. In this regard an institutional ar-
rangement within the DOD for focusing attention on the elements of
change and the longer-run issues could be invaluable. As managers of
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tude of detached questioning, which Walter Bagehot regarded as the
most fruitful role for a minister. In principle, some institutional means
for fostering constructive criticism can be created. In practice, however,
the problem would be to prevent such internal institutions, ostensibly
devoted to study of the long run, from being turned like everything else
to the pursuit of short-mn objectives.